We begin the series of posts by outlining the effects of single-blow measures. Wisconsin Act 10, otherwise known as the Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, was a bill proposed by Wisconsin governor Scott Walker and passed into law in 2011. Ostensibly it was meant to reduce a deficit in the state budget [1], but its principal effect was to make collective bargaining prohibitively difficult for most public employees of the state of Wisconsin. Here are all the little ways it did this:
The law limited the right of public employees (with the exception of firefighters and most law enforcement workers) to collectively bargain for anything other than their base salary [1]. In particular, public-sector unions were prohibited from bargaining over pensions, health coverage, safety, working hours, sick leave, or vacations [2]. Furthermore, even the bargaining they were permitted to do over salaries was severely limited—any raises for public employees were not to exceed inflation, unless those raises were approved by a referendum [1, 2]. Public-sector employers were also forbidden from collecting union dues from employees, and employees could not be required to pay them [1, 3]. Public-sector unions were also required to take annual votes in order to maintain certification as a collective bargaining representative for their members [1, 3]. Any contracts made with employers were also limited to one year [1, 3]. And in the case of a governor-declared a state of emergency, the law authorized the appointment of authorities to terminate any employees who are absent for three days without approval of the employer or any employees that participate in a strike [1, 3].
The law also stripped some public-sector employees of their authority to collectively bargain entirely. Home health care workers under the Medicaid program, employees of University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics, and University of Wisconsin faculty and academic staff lost the authority to engage in any collective bargaining under this law [1, 3]. Family child care workers were also forbidden from collectively bargaining with the State [1, 3].
Effects on Unions and Graduate Student Workers in Wisconsin
We reached out to Michael Billeaux, current co-president of the graduate labor union at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Teaching Assistants Association (TAA), to find what it’s like to keep unions afloat under the new law. “Act 10 has been basically successful in disorganizing the labor movement in Wisconsin,” he says. Even for locals that were able to extend their contracts “the three major public sector unions in Wisconsin – WEAC (the state NEA organization, which organizes the vast majority of K-12 teachers and staff), the AFT-Wisconsin, and AFSCME – had each lost 30-50% of their membership as of 2012-13.” Of course unions that were not able to extend their agreements hemorrhaged members in greater numbers, upwards of “80-90%.”
Billeaux explained how the bill’s provisions make it more difficult to organize: “The day-to-day tasks have become much more difficult. There is no longer any payroll dues deduction, so we have to collect dues essentially by hand, and our treasurer has to do a lot more work. We lost agency fees/”fair share” dues, and in 2011 we lost all of our membership, so we have to fight very hard to rebuild with much less in terms of financial resources. We also ended up having to let go of our only two staff people. And basic organizing conversations became more difficult, because now we have a real collective action problem (i.e., without fair share, people can benefit from what we win without contributing anything, and so it becomes more difficult to convince anyone to contribute, and therefore to win). Not having legal bargaining has meant that dealings with the administration have been frustratingly informal.”
Still, he noted, “the TAA has managed to hold up unusually well under these conditions.
We were faced with a choice between addressing our need to rebuild by taking an extremely cautious approach or by making bold demands (that both have a strong basis in justice and also are relatively reasonable expenses to the university) despite the loss of bargaining rights. We took the latter approach, which has meant that we’ve had to emphasize member mobilization and action since we’ve basically lost the bargaining option altogether. I think the union has been able to maintain, and in some cases even increase, its relevance to members through this strategy.”
Notably, he concluded, “TAA’s success over the last 3 years has been entirely outside formal legal bargaining structures altogether.” He cited what he called the “usual lessons” to explain the success: “Give the members a way to get involved and take ownership of the union and its campaigns; make bold demands and encourage the putting forward of more bold demands, because their necessity is often most obvious and most deeply based in basic notions of justice, etc; and make it clear that our interests are in the interests of other groups, and bring these to bear on the campaign (e.g., getting faculty and undergraduate support, etc). Nothing new here, of course, but we have been able to join a long list of examples that show that if the labor movement cultivates rank-and-file leadership and militancy, workers can win even in very hostile conditions.”
Sources:
[1] “2011 Wisconsin Act 10.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 24 Nov. 2014. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.
[2] Greenhouse, Steven. “Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 22 Feb. 2014. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.
[3] Governor Scott Walker (2011-02-11). “Governor Walker Introduces Budget Repair.” State of Wisconsin. Office of the Governor. http://walker.wi.gov/newsroom/press-release/governor-walker-introduces-budget-repair.
[4] Kroll, Andy. “What’s Happening in Wisconsin Explained.” Mother Jones. N.p., 17 Mar. 2011. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.
[5] “Teaching Assistants Association.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 31 July 2014. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.
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